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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from an order of partial summary judgment 
of the District Court determining the priority of a trust deed 
with respect to certain real property located in Utah County as 
against competing mechanic's lien claims, which the court reduced 
to a final judgment pursuant to the provisions of Utah R. Civ. 
P. 54(b) . The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Constitution Article VIII, Section 3 and Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) § 78-2-2(3)(i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court correctly ruled that 
mechanics' liens for architectural services and engineering work, 
like all other mechanic's liens, take priority only from the 
commencement of visible, on-site improvements to real property 
which constitute the time from which mechanics' liens take prior-
ity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (1953) §§ 38-1-5 and 38-1-10. 
2. Whether the district court correctly ruled that 
a judicial foreclosure has the legal effect of cutting off any 
mechanic's lien claims attributable to, or attempting to relate 
back to, work done prior to the date of such judicial foreclosure. 
3. Alternatively, whether an improvement establishes 
only the priority of mechanics' liens claimed for the particular 
improvement and extends only to such real property as may be 
necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the improvement 
under Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-4.x 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes whose interpretation and construction 
are determinative of the issues presented in this case are Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) §§ 38-1-3, -4, -5, -10 and -11, as well as 
§ 78-37-3, which are set out verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 
16-19.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a consolidated action to foreclose mechanics' 
liens recorded against certain real property, which was to com-
prise the Heritage Mountain ski resort in Utah County. (R. 155, 
419, 1259.) The construction lender, Guaranty Savings and Loan 
Association ("Guaranty Savings"), moved for partial summary judg-
ment asserting that its deed of trust with respect to the property 
had priority over all mechanic's lien claims filed with respect 
to the property. (R. 1283.) The mechanic's lien claimants op-
posed the motion and filed cross-motions for summary judgment 
as to the issue of priority. (R. 1454, 1537, 1549, 1772.) The 
district court entered a ruling in favor of Guaranty Savings, 
1
 In 1987, the Utah legislature amended Section 38-1-4, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953). 1987 Utah Laws, ch. 170, § 2. The amended 
text of § 38-1-4, Utah Code Ann. (1987 Supp.) is set out in the 
Addendum. (Add. 19.) All references to Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
§ 38-1-4 are to the statute as in effect prior to the 1987 amend-
ment, which had remained unchanged since the 1943 codification. 
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holding that (1) architectural services do not constitute com-
mencement of visible, on-site improvements to which mechanic's 
lien claims, including the provider of the architectural services, 
will relate for priority purposes; (2) a judgment of foreclosure 
in a prior action precluded the relation back of work subsequent 
to such foreclosure to work which preceded such foreclosure; 
and (3) there were no visible, on-site improvements predating 
the construction lender's deed of trust to which mechanic's lien 
claims could relate. (R. 1934-39, 1990-98; Add. 1-15.) The 
district court certified its order as final under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 54(b) (R. 1998; Add. 15) , and this Appeal by various mechanic's 
lien claimants followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation and Norbert W. 
Pieper, A.I.A., Inc.'s Statement of Facts contained in their brief 
does not adequately summarize the history of the development of 
the relevant real property or delineate the facts which were 
undisputed at the time Guaranty Savings' Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment was heard by the trial court. For that reason, 
respondent sets forth herein a litigation history of the project, 
a brief description of the parties hereto, and a statement of 
facts which were undisputed and upon which the trial court granted 
Guaranty Savings' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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A. Litigation History of Project. 
This is not the first litigation involving the property 
which is the subject of this action• A summary of the past his-
tory is as follows: 
lo Phase I (First Security Bank of Utah v. Wilderness 
Associates, Civil No. 54367). On November 17, 1982, the Fourth 
District Court, through the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, entered 
a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and specifically held: 
[T]hat each person whose conveyance or encum-
brance is unrecorded or was recorded subse-
quent to the plaintiff's filing of the Lis 
Pendens herein be, and hereby is, declared 
to be forever barred or foreclosed of all 
right, claim, lien, and equity or other right 
of redemption in and to the Total Property 
or any portion thereof. 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, f 13. (R. 1172). 
A Sheriff's Sale was held on December 23, 1982, at 
which time Paramount Life Insurance Company was the successful 
bidder. (R. 1179.) There was no redemption and a Sheriff's 
Deed was later issued to Paramount Life Insurance Company. 
(R. 1191-94.) 
2 . Phase II (Dwayne J. Sykes v. Wilderness Associates , 
Civil No. 62546). Dwayne J. Sykes filed an action in which he 
attempted to foreclose a mechanic's lien he had recorded with 
the Utah County Recorder after the commencement of the First 
Security foreclosure action. Sykes was not named as a party 
defendant in the Phase I litigation. The Fourth District Court, 
through the Honorable George E. Ballif, ruled that Sykes' claims 
for mechanics' interests in and to any of the property were 
- 4 -
extinguished pursuant to the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. 
(R. 1936; Add. 3,5.) 
3. Phase III (Pending Action). This action was com-
menced by mechanics to foreclose their liens and asserting prior-
ity over Guaranty Savings. 
B, Classification of the Parties. 
1. Guaranty Savings. Guaranty Savings and Loan loaned 
$16.9 million to Heritage Mountain Development, Inc., formerly 
known as Wilderness Associates, Inc. ("Heritage"), secured by 
Deeds of Trust as to which the priority issue of this appeal 
pertains. 
2. Architects and Engineers. One class of lien 
holders consists of architects and engineers whose services were 
limited to the conceptual planning of the development rather 
than the performance of any work of improvement on the ground. 
These architects and engineers include two of the appellants, 
Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation and Norbert W. Pieper, A.I.A., 
Inc. 
3. Other Claimants. The third appellant, Nordic 
Constructors, Inc., is one of the contractors who performed labor 
or supplied materials subsequent to the recordation of Guaranty 
Savings7 Trust Deed in September, 1983. Other parties below, 
none of which have pursued an appeal, included other such contrac-
tors, entities associated with Heritage, and other lending insti-
tutions which do not claim priority over Guaranty Savings. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
Guaranty Savings submits that the following are the 
undisputed material facts upon which the district court entered 
judgment as to the issue of priority: 
1. Heritage is a subsidiary of Heritage Mountain 
Resort, Inc., and at all times relevant herein, it, or its 
predecessor-in-interest, Wilderness Associates, has had an inter-
est in certain real property (referred to as the "Property") 
located in Utah County, State of Utah comprising the following 
distinct interests: 
a. 110 acres owned in fee simple ("Fee Prop-
erty") ; 
b. 41 acres leased from the State of Utah 
("Leased Property"); and 
c. 4500 acres of Federal land under Special 
Use Permit from the United States Forest Service ("Permit 
Property"), (R. 1147-48; Williamson Dep. 20-39.) 
2. In October, 1972, Wilderness Associates began 
planning the development of a ski resort and related facilities 
(the "Development") which would encompass the Fee Property, the 
Leased Property, and the Permit Property in Utah County, State 
of Utah. (R. 1148; Williamson Dep. 20-39.) 
3. In December, 1976, Wilderness Associates leased 
the Leased Property from the City of Provo with the consent of 
the State of Utah for the purpose of setting up a sales and busi-
ness office. (R. 1148; Williamson Dep. 27.) 
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4. On September 12, 1978, Wilderness Associates ob-
tained a building permit to remodel a barn located on the Leased 
Property for use as an office building. The remodeling work 
included sewer, water, roofing, parking, sidewalks, entrance 
way, replacement of windows, construction of offices, and interior 
design- The purpose of the office building was to serve as the 
company headquarters of Wilderness Associates (and later Heritage 
Mountain Resort, Inc.), and its use and occupation were limited 
to that purpose. It was, and is, a self-contained building whose 
use is not dependent upon the completion of the entire proposed 
Development* All remodeling work done pursuant to the building 
permit issued in 1978 had been completed on the office building 
by the summer of 1982, at which time all work thereon was sus-
pended. All sewer and water work contemplated by the building 
permit were completed by the summer of 1980. (R. 1148-49, 1156, 
1245-46; Williamson Dep. 41.) 
5. On or about November 17, 1982, the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, with the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen presiding, entered a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure on the Fee Property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
§ 78-37-1 et seq. (the "Paramount Foreclosure"). (R. 1149, 
1157-78.) 
6. Prior to the entry of the Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure on November 17, 1982, the only work of improvement 
actually done on the ground on the Fee Property, the Leased Prop-
erty, or the Permit Property was performed at the location of 
- 7 -
the offices of Heritage Mountain Resort, Inc., which offices 
are located on the Leased Property. This work was completed 
before the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was entered on 
November 17, 1982. In 1978, a construction access road was rough 
cut. (Williamson Dep. 106-08.) Also between September, 1978 
and the summer of 1982, ski trail design (including preliminary 
flagging and some clearing necessary for design) was undertaken 
on the Permit Property on the mountain. (Williamson Dep. 43, 
88; Compton Dep. 17-24.) The only other work initiated in connec-
tion with any property in which Heritage Mountain Resort, Inc. 
had an interest before the Paramount Foreclosure was limited to 
architectural, engineering, and surveying work, including core 
sampling. (R. 1149, 1246.) 
7. On December 23, 1982, the Sheriff of Utah County, 
State of Utah, sold the Fee Property at public auction to 
Paramount Life Insurance Company ("Paramount"), pursuant to the 
Paramount Foreclosure. (R. 1149, 1179-82.) 
8. On April 21, 1983, Heritage Mountain Development 
Company executed a Deed of Trust ("IMI Trust Deed") in favor of 
Investment Mortgage International (!lIMIfl) , as Beneficiary, to 
secure the payment of $3,405,000 representing loan origination 
fees for a loan to construct the proposed Development. (R. 1150, 
1183-90.) 
9. On June 23, 1983, subsequent to the running of the 
redemption period, the Sheriff of Utah County, State of Utah, 
delivered a Sheriff's Deed to Paramount. (R. 1191-94.) 
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10. On June 29, 1983, Heritage obtained a $2,000,000 
loan from Guaranty Savings and, in connection therewith, Heritage 
executed a Promissory Note in favor of Guaranty Savings in the 
amount of $2,000,000 ("June Note"). (R. 1150.) 
11. To secure the June Note, Heritage executed a Deed 
of Trust with Assignment of Rents, ("June Trust Deed") with Valley 
Title as trustee and Guaranty Savings as Beneficiary. The June 
Trust Deed was recorded on June 29, 1983 in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder. (R. 1150, 1195-1210.) 
12. On June 29, 1983, Heritage, using proceeds of 
the June Note, repurchased the Fee Property from Paramount, which 
delivered a Quit Claim Deed to Heritage. (R. 1151, 1211-14.) 
13. No work of any kind, including work on sewer or 
water lines, was performed on the Fee Property, the Leased Prop-
erty, or the Permit Property between the time of the Paramount 
Foreclosure of November 17, 1982 and the repurchase of the Fee 
Property by Heritage on June 29, 1983, although certain staking 
was done in connection with a survey done by Aztec Engineering, 
Inc. at the request of the title company to identify the bound-
aries of the property. (R. 1151, 1246, 1592-96.) 
14. On or about September 15, 1983, Heritage executed 
a Promissory Note (the "September Note11) in favor of Guaranty 
Savings in the amount of $16,900,000. (R. 1151, 1215-17; 
Williamson Dep. 47.) 
15. To secure the September Note, Heritage executed 
a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents (the "September Trust 
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Deed") with Valley Title Company as trustee and Guaranty Savings 
as beneficiary. The September Deed of Trust was recorded in 
the office of the Utah County Recorder on September 15, 1983. 
(R. 1151-52, 1218-37.) 
16. The principal amount of the September Note in-
cluded, in part, funds to be utilized to satisfy the unpaid obli-
gation evidenced by the June Note and an unpaid obligation of 
$2,617,000 to IMI to obtain a release of the IMI Trust Deed. 
There was never any intent on the part of Heritage to affect 
the priority of Guaranty Savings' security interest in Heritage's 
property obtained under the June Trust Deed other than improve 
that position through the release of the IMI Trust Deed. The 
intention of Heritage was to assure that Guaranty Savings had a 
first position security interest in the Fee Property. (R. 1152.) 
17. Between the recording of the June Trust Deed on 
June 29, 1983 and the recording of the September Trust Deed on 
September 15, 1983, no work of improvement of any kind, including 
work on sewer or water lines, was performed on the ground on 
any of the Leased Property, the Fee Property, or the Permit Prop-
erty. The only work which was performed during that period in 
connection with the proposed Development was by architects and 
engineers and other persons planning the proposed Development. 
(R. 1152, 1246; Williamson Dep. 47.) 
18. On October 6, 1983, a second Building Permit was 
issued by Provo City for remodeling and reroofing the office 
building and the construction of a pedestrian bridge. The work 
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contemplated by the permit was performed after its issuance. 
Prior to the recommencement of work on the office building, there 
had been a complete suspension of work on all portions of the 
Property for a period of approximately one year, (R. 1152-53, 
1238.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly applied the standard that 
all mechanic's lien claims take priority from the date of the 
first visible, on-site improvements to real property which are 
part of a single project of development that has not been mate-
rially suspended or interrupted. Furthermore, the district court 
correctly ruled that architectural and engineering services, while 
clearly entitling the provider of such services to claim a mechan-
ic's lien under Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended) § 38-1-3,2 do 
not constitute improvements to real property to which mechanics' 
liens are entitled to relate for priority purposes under Utah 
Code Ann, (1953) § 38-1-5. 
Furthermore, the district court correctly ruled that 
mechanic's lien claimants relate back only to work which is part 
of a single project of improvement which is pursued with reason-
able continuity and is not materially abandoned or interrupted. 
Specifically, the district court correctly ruled that a judgment 
* Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann, was amended in 1987. 
1987 Utah Laws, ch. 170, § 1. The 1987 amendment, however, is 
not material to the instant case, although the pre-amendment 
statute is technically applicable at all times relevant hereto. 
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of foreclosure has the necessary legal effect of precluding the 
relation back of any work performed with respect to real property 
occurring after the date of such foreclosure to any work done 
prior to the date of the decree of foreclosure. 
Alternatively, any work on the Heritage headquarters 
building prior to the judicial foreclosure could establish the 
priority of the mechanics' liens only as to the Leased Property 
because Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-4 limits the extent of 
mechanics' liens to such real property as is necessary for the 
convenient use and operation of the improvement to which they 
relate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD 
FOR DETERMINING THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF GUARANTY 
SAVINGS' TRUST DEED AND THE MECHANICS' LIENS. 
A. Mechanics' Liens Take Priority Only From the First Visible, 
On-site Work of Improvement. 
The central issue before this Court is whether archi-
tectural and engineering work, done prior to the recording of 
Guaranty Savings' Trust Deed establishes the priority of mechan-
ic's lien claims as superior to that Trust Deed. Priority of a 
mechanic's lien is governed by Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-5, 
which provides in pertinent part: 
The liens herein provided for shall relate 
back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish mate-
rials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement, and shall have priority over 
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which 
may have attached subsequently to the time 
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when the building, improvement or structure 
was commenced, or begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground, (Emphasis added.) 
As these requirements have been fleshed out in determi-
nations by this Court, the establishment of a mechanic's lien 
priority requires activity on the property that, either as the 
result of work done or by the presence of materials furnished 
to the property, visibly demonstrates that work has been commenced 
or material furnished for the improvement of the property. See 
Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982) ; West-
ern Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 18 Utah 
2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967). See also Note, 1966 Utah L. 
Rev. 181, 187 ("usually, construction will be deemed to have 
commenced at the time that some physical work is performed on the 
ground, which can readily be seen and recognized as the commence-
ment of a building"). 
As developed by a consistent line of cases from this 
Court, it is not enough that there be visible signs of any kind 
of activity but rather there must be some visible evidence of 
work of improvement. 
In Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 
1982), the Court rejected mechanics7 liens claim of priority 
because ff[a]t no point up to and including the time [the lenders'] 
mortgage was recorded was it evident from the inspection of the 
premises that an improvement had been commenced.M (Emphasis 
added.) This is clearly more than mere "visibility." Moreover, 
the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between visible work that 
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does not constitute an "improvement" within the meaning of the 
mechanic's lien statute (and to which all mechanic's lien claim-
ants would be entitled to relate back) and other work (which in 
fact is visible but does not rise to the level of an "improve-
ment") . The Court stated that "visible evidence of work performed 
provides notice to any interested party that work has commenced." 
652 P.2d at 924 n. 1. 
Earlier, in Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood 
Construction Co.. 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967), the 
Court construed the legislative intent behind Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-5 as follows: 
We are not inclined to give the statute 
such a broad meaning as contended for by the 
appellants. We are inclined to view that 
the legislature intended the language "com-
mencement to do work or furnish materials on 
the ground" to be limited to relate to the 
home or other structure which was being or 
about to be built upon the land. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Moreover, Western Mortgage indicates that first "qualifying" 
work may not extend indefinitely into the past, but that the 
visible work must be part of a single ongoing project and of 
such a nature as would indicate to third parties that there was 
ongoing work which might be the subject of subsisting mechanics' 
liens. 424 P.2d at 439. 
Also, in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C. N. 
Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), the Court reiterated 
the requirement of an improvement quoting an earlier case, Stanton 
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Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 
209 (1959): 
The purpose of the lien statutes is to protect 
those who have added directly to the value 
of property by performing labor or furnishing 
materials upon it. (Emphasis added.) 
600 P.2d at 524-25. 
Even more recently, this Court has characterized the 
point to which mechanics' liens relate back under Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) § 38-1-5 as "the commencement of work on the ground.11 
Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 736, 737 (Utah 1985) (emphasis 
added) (per curiam) . And in All Weather Insulation, Inc. v. 
Amiron Development Corp., 702 P.2d 1176, 1177 (Utah 1985), this 
Court noted, without comment and without reaching the merits, that 
the standard applied by the Seventh District Court was the occur-
rence of the "first visible work performed on the job site." 
(Emphasis added.) See also Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P. 2d 1051, 
1054-55 (Utah App. 1987). 
This two-pronged test (visibility and improvement) as 
to what work is sufficient to establish the priority of mechanics7 
liens is consistent with the dual purposes behind the mechanic's 
lien statute. While the primary purpose, of course, is to protect 
those who supply labor or materials in connection with any con-
struction project, these interests must be balanced against the 
legitimate interests of other third parties who may deal with 
the property. The requirement of visible commencement of improve-
ments establishes an objective test which may be applied to pro-
tect the interests of third parties, including construction 
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lenders such as Guaranty Savings, who advance money on the basis 
of security interests in real property which is to be developed. 
This balancing of competing interests which undergirds 
the mechanic's lien statute has been consistently applied in con-
nection with construing the mechanic's lien statutes since first 
proposed by Thomas Jefferson and enacted in Maryland. The Mary-
land Court, construing the successor to that earliest of statutes, 
expressed the rule as follows: 
[B]efore there can be the commencement of a 
building which would give a mechanic's lien 
claimant a preference over a recorded mort-
gage, there must be (1) a manifest commence-
ment of some work or labor on the ground 
which everyone can readily see and recognize 
as the commencement of a building and (2) the 
work done must have been begin with the inten-
tion and purpose then formed to continue 
the work until the completion of the building. 
RUDD v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, 230 Md. 573, 188 Ac2d 146, (1963) 
(emphasis added). 
B. Architectural and Engineering Services Do not Constitute 
Visible, On-Site Work of Improvement Establishing Priority 
of Mechanics' Liens. 
While this Court's decision in Zions First National 
Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970), expressly 
determined that architects are entitled to a lien pursuant to 
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953),3 even if their work is 
3
 The decision in Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 
424 P.2d 446 (1967), similarly does not support the architects' 
claim to priority. While the lien claimant was a landscape archi-
tect, it was the actual landscaping, and not the design work, 
that constituted an improvement giving rise to a lien. See 424 
P.2d at 448-49. The case did not involve an issue of priority. 
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never brought to fruition in the construction of a building, 
the issue of priority was not involved, as expressly noted in the 
opinion. The Court indicated in Carlson that the priority problem 
would not justify depriving architects of their lien as against 
the owner of the property. Rather, the court concluded that 
the priorities as between other third parties would have to be 
adjusted (without deciding how such adjustment would be made). 
464 P.2d at 389. 
Indeed, the Court in Carlson, id., acknowledged the 
reasoning of the most recent scholarly review of Utah's mechanic's 
lien law published in the Utah Law Review, which concluded that 
an architect's or surveyor's lien: 
should attach at the time of the "visible to 
the eye" commencement of construction. Other-
wise, there will be no practical way for 
interested parties to ascertain whether or 
not liens have accrued on the property. 
. . . . Before persons risk their ser-
vices and materials by improving property, 
or risk their capital by loaning money for 
construction purposes, they should be able 
to ascertain whether any prior liens will 
dilute the value of the liens to which they 
are entitled. If the difficult question of 
whether construction has begun must be liti-
gated in each case, both mechanics and finan-
ciers will be reluctant to become involved 
in contributing to improvements upon land. 
Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 181, 188 (emphasis added). 
In the only Utah appellate decision addressing the 
effect of preliminary engineering and surveying work, Tripp v. 
Vaughn, 747 P. 2d 1051 (Utah App. 1987) , the Utah Court of Appeals 
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determined that a survey which established the interior boundaries 
of the property "were not sufficiently noticeable or related to 
actual construction to impart notice to a prudent lender" that 
work had commenced under the standard established by this Court 
in Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982) 
and Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 
18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967). See 747 P.2d at 
1054-55. 
The distinction between rights of mechanics against 
the owner of property (where no priority issue exists) and the 
adjustment of relative priorities of third parties is crucial 
to a proper application of the mechanics' liens statute. As 
against the property owner, this Court has recognized that an 
architect "may file a lien upon the property concerning which 
he has rendered professional service, although his plans may 
not be brought to fruition by erection of a building," Zions 
First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387, 
388 (1970) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, as against third 
parties, the priority of such liens relates only to the date on 
which work is actually done on the ground or, assuming work is 
never commenced, from the date of recording of the lien itself, 
as discussed above (see pp. 12-16, supra). 
Section 38-1-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953), expressly pro-
vides that all mechanics' and materialmen's liens are upon equal 
footing regardless of the time when the work was performed. 
Section 38-1-5 establishes that all mechanics' and materialmen's 
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liens are given priority as of "the time of commencement to do 
work or furnish materials on the around for the structure or 
improvement11 (emphasis added) and "shall have priority over any 
lien, mortgage, or other encumbrance which may have attached 
subsequently to the time when the building, improvement, or 
structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished 
on the ground."4 
The legislature's requirement that priority relate to 
the commencement of visible work on the ground is based upon 
sound policy considerations. To establish the priority of mech-
anics' liens by reference to off-site or non-visible work would 
4
 The mechanic's lien claimants attempt, through tortured 
interpretation, to argue that the words "on the ground" only 
modify the words "materials furnished" and not "work begun," 
such an interpretation is not justified given the wording of 
the statute, let alone the interpretation of the Utah courts. 
(See, pp. 13-15, supra.) If anything, the claimants' proposed 
interpretation would lead to the creation of two classes of lien 
holders. 
There is no reason that a materialman should be required 
to deliver materials to the job-site while a laborer who performs 
services elsewhere is somehow entitled to have his lien attach 
notwithstanding the fact that there was no visible work on the 
ground. On the one hand, lien holders who provide only services 
could claim that their services were deemed commenced for purposes 
of priority when the first pen was put to paper at their offices, 
whether by an engineer, an architect, or other labor intensive 
contractor. On the other hand, materialmen could only claim 
priority from the date the material was furnished on the ground 
even though such materialmen would have performed many activities 
similar to those of engineers and architects, while incurring 
substantial obligations to provide the materials for the planned 
improvements. Indeed, a materialman may be providing services 
in connection with the fabrication of custom-designed materials 
months before the material is delivered to the job site. Surely, 
the materialmen's work in preparing for the delivery of the mate-
rial to the project site is just as significant as the labor 
intensive contractor's work in his office. 
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prevent a construction lender from ever obtaining priority on a 
project. As a practical matter, loans cannot be made absent a 
formal proposal setting forth, among other things, an explana-
tion of the scope of the project and a presentation of the 
projected costs to potential lenders. This process generally 
requires the preparation and presentation of professional drawings 
and estimates. Moreover, a prudent lender generally requires a 
survey of the property, which may include the placing of stakes, 
for the very purpose of inspecting the property to establish 
the lack of commencement of construction. If these preparatory 
services deprived a lender of priority, the result would not 
only be unfair, but loans would simply not be made in this State.5 
The legislature specifically recognized this possibility and to 
avoid such a claim provided that mechanics' liens attach upon 
the commencement of visible work on the ground. To do otherwise 
^ The drastic, adverse effects that an alteration of 
traditional rules of lien priority can produce are illustrated 
by the effect of Senate Bill 300 enacted in 1983, which granted 
a priority lien to condominium owners' associations for condo-
minium maintenance fees and assessments. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 
178, § 1 (amending § 57-8-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
As a result of that enactment, the secondary market for mortgages 
on condominium units was eliminated. (See, e.g. , Memorandum dated 
May 27, 1983 from Allen P. Miller, Regional Vice President, 
Federal National Mortgage Association, a copy of which was submit-
ted to the court and all opposing counsel at the hearing below. 
(Add. 23.)) The legislature was forced to repeal the priority 
provisions in a special session held the same year. 1983 Utah 
Laws (1st Spec. Sess.), ch. 3, § 1. 
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would have sounded the death knell of Utah's construction and 
real estate industries.6 
1. The majority rule adopted by sister jurisdictions re-
garding the priority of architects' and engineers7 
services fairly balances the interests of all parties 
dealing with real property. 
The analysis suggested in the Utah Law Review is iden-
tical to the position adopted in at least five sister 
jurisdictions. Courts in the states of California, Michigan, 
Nevada, Minnesota, and Arkansas have all determined that prepara-
tory services of architects and engineers, do not constitute 
the commencement of work which establishes the priority of mechan-
ics' liens. See Williams & Works, Inc. v. Springfield Corp., 408 
Mich. 732, 293 N.W.2d 304 (1980); Aladdin Heating Corp. v. Trust-
ees of the Central States Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund, 
93 Nev. 257, 260, 563 P.2d 82, 84 (1977) ; Walker v. Lvtton Savings 
& Loan Ass'n of Northern California, 2 Cal. 3d 152, 84 Cal. Rptr. 
521, 465 P.2d 497 (1970) Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279 
Minn. 107, 113-14, 156 N.W.2d 247, 251-52 (1968); Clark v. General 
b
 The mechanics lien claimants make the argument, at-
tractive on the surface, that a lender could easily protect itself 
from adverse determinations of priority by requiring that archi-
tects and other providers of preparatory services be paid out 
of the first draw on the construction loan. It is clear, however, 
that this would not protect the lender, in view of this Court's 
decision in Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P. 2d 734 (Utah 1985), which 
determined that the first work at the site establishes the date 
from which other mechanics' liens take priority, even if the 
mechanic providing such work releases or waives its own lien 
rights. On the other hand, the architects and engineers, by 
virtue of their contract with a developer, are in a position to 
assure that they are compensated for their work either by 
requiring payment in advance or out of the initial draws on the 
construction loan. 
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Electric Co. , 243 Ark. 399, 406, 420 S.W.2d 830, 834 (1967). 
In addition, at least two sister states (Minnesota and Wisconsin) 
have enacted the same rule by statute. See Williams & Works, 
Inc., supra, 293 N.W.2d at 513 n. 12.7. 
Moreover, in Walker v. Lvtton Savings & Loan Ass/n of 
Northern California, 2 Cal. 3d 152, 84 Cal. Rptr. 521, 465 P.2d 
497 (1970), the Supreme Court of California expressly rejected 
7
 In addition, a host of other jurisdictions have ex-
pressly decided that work of architects, engineers and surveyors 
does not constitute commencement of an improvement for mechanics' 
liens purposes. See Haines, Jones, Farrell, White, Gima Archi-
tects, Ltd, v. Maalaea Land Corp., 62 Haw. 13, 608 P.2d 405 (1980) 
(removal of a ceiling and door, boundary marking with pins, and 
test borings not a visible improvement); Gollehon, Schemmer & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Fareware-Bettendorf Assocs., 268 N.W.2d 200 
(Iowa 1978) (survey, boundary marking with metal pins, and lathes, 
marking pipeline and sewer easements did not "improve" land); 
Torkko/Korman/Engineers, v. Penland Ventures, 673 P. 2d 769 (Alaska 
1983) (design services not an improvement); Sheridan, Inc. v. 
Palchanis, 172 So.2d 872 (Fla. App. 1965) (staking to locate 
improvements to be constructed did not constitute commencement); 
M. E. Kraft Excavating & Grading Co. v. Barac Construction Co., 
279 Minn. 278, 156 N.W.2d 748 (1968) (preliminary staking of 
tract did not constitute commencement) ; Diversified Mortgage 
Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractor, Inc., 57 6 
S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1978) (survey, staking, and test holes do not 
constitute commencement); Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. Monona 
Shores, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 171, 177 N.W.2d 340 (1970) (placing of 
stakes to indicate street layout and cut and fill levels did 
not constitute commencement of an improvement under the lien 
statute); Herriman National Bank v. North Shaker Boulevard Co., 
22 Ohio App. 487, 153 N.E. 909 (Ohio 1924) (digging of test hole 
and the driving of stakes locating the improvements did not con-
stitute commencement) ; H. B. Deal Construction Co. v. Labor 
Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. 1967) (surveying work 
to determine boundary of property, location of building, and 
placement of stakes for excavation purposes was not commencement) ; 
Roberts v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 222 So.2d 32 (Fla. 
1969) (placement of surveyor stakes was not commencement); Reuben 
E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279 Minn. 107, 156 N.W.2d 247 (1968) 
(placement of boundary markers and grade stakes was not commence-
ment) ; Tracy Price Associates v. Hebard, 266 Cal. App. 2d 778, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1968). 
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the argument that a mortgage lender may not assert priority of 
its secured interest over that of an architect where the mort-
gage lender had actual knowledge of architects7 plans and specifi-
cations in connection with making the loan. 
The Walker decision stated that, to establish an archi-
tect's lien prior to commencement of the actual work on the site: 
[W]ould appear to confuse, if not destroy, 
the statutory scheme of priorities . . . . 
But if, despite these specific and de-
tailed rules laid down by the Legislature, 
it be held for the benefit of plaintiff archi-
tects that even though, as here, an encum-
brance has attached before any work has been 
done on the owners' property or materials 
delivered thereto for a planned improvement, 
nevertheless the work of improvement had com-
menced earlier when the architects began work 
on the plans and specifications, then all 
liens of all others who contributed work and 
materials to the work of improvement [refer-
ence omitted] would likewise relate back to 
the earlier date of commencement and thereby 
take priority over the subsequent encum-
brance—whether given for a construction 
loan or based on some other consideration. 
That the Legislature intended no such result 
seems obvious. Additionally, under such 
circumstances it would appear that construc-
tion loans would shortly become next to impos-
sible to obtain, as it is a rare construction 
project of any magnitude which does not re-
quire the preliminary nonvisible services 
of architects or engineers. But if all liens 
arising from the subsequent construction 
will relate back to the date of commencement 
of the nonvisible services, how many prudent 
businessmen would be willing to assume the 
risk? 
. . . . It is a matter of common know-
ledge that construction loans are not bestowed 
in a vacuum and without awareness and approval 
by lenders of the nature and detail of the 
proposed improvements which the owner has 
requested the lender to finance. If the 
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lender's use and reliance upon the plans 
prepared by an architect on behalf of the 
owner is to work a change in the statutory 
priority rules, the change must be sought 
from the Legislature and not from this court. 
465 Pc2d at 502-03. See also Tracy Price Associates v. Hebard, 
266 Cal. App. 2d 778, 72 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1968). 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Michigan has deter-
mined that services of an engineer, including on-site soil borings 
and surveys, do not constitute the commencement of work which 
establishes the priorities under Michigan mechanic's lien law. 
See Williams & Works, Inc. v. Springfield Corp. 408 Mich. 732, 
293 NoW.2d 304 (1980). 
As with Utah's statute, Michigan's mechanic's lien law 
was amended to specifically provide a lien for the work of engi-
neers. Nevertheless, the Michigan court expressly rejected the 
argument that by amending the mechanic's lien statute to include 
engineers' services, the Michigan legislature had also intended 
to overturn the requirement of visible, on-site commencement of 
construction: 
[W]e think it unreasonable to believe 
the Legislature intended to indirectly change 
[the sections of the mechanic's lien statute 
establishing priorities], containing the 
traditional and well-established rule requir-
ing a visible, on-site commencement of con-
struction in order to establish priority, 
by the simple expansion of the lienable ser-
vices outlined in a different section. . . . 
[Those sections] treat of fsic] two entirely 
different concepts. [One] merely determines 
what is a lienable service in Michigan. It 
runs the gamut from the furnisher of labor 
and materials to the surveyor and engineer 
to the renter or lessor of equipment and 
the supplier of nursery stock. [Reference 
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omitted.] [The other section], on the other 
hand, deals with the determination of when 
a particular lien attaches for priority pur-
poses. It specifically leaves the estab-
lishment of what services are lienable to 
another part of the act . . . and concerns 
itself primarily with the ascertainment of 
priority among the liens. . . . 
We feel our holding today is consonant 
with the great weight of modern judicial au-
thority. . . . 
293 N.W.2d at 311-12 (emphasis in original). 
The Michigan court also specifically rejected the argu-
ment that a mortgage lender who relies on plans and specifications 
prepared by an architect or engineer is somehow estopped from 
relying on the visible and actual commencement standard. 293 
N.W.2d at 314. 
In view of the fact that Utah has clearly adopted the 
standard that visible, on-site construction of improvements 
establishes the date upon which mechanics' liens attach and with 
respect to which their priority is determined (See Calder Bros. 
Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982); Western Mortgage 
Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 412, 
424 P.2d 437, 438 (1967)), architects7 and engineers7 services, 
although clearly lienable under the Utah statute, do not establish 
the date from which mechanics7 lien priority is determined. 
2. Colorado case law is not binding upon this Court and 
the minority position to which Colorado adheres should 
be rejected. 
The mechanic's lien claimants argue that the statutory 
construction adopted by decisions of Colorado courts establishes 
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the proper interpretation of Utah's mechanic's lien statute be-
cause Utah's statute was adopted from Colorado• (Appellants' 
Brief at 12-15.) The mechanic's lien claimants cite the Utah 
Supreme Court decision in Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. , 679 P. 2d 903 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that another 
state's judicial construction of a statute is presumed to be 
adopted along with the statute. While the Jensen case acknow-
ledges the existence of such a presumption, the Court carefully 
noted the exceptions to the rule, and in the case then before 
it, refused to follow the judicial interpretations of the courts 
of the sister state from which the Utah statute under review 
was adopted. 
The language of this Court in Jensen is instructive: 
We recognize that when the Legislature 
adopts a statute from another state, the 
presumption is that the Legislature is famil-
iar with that state's judicial interpretations 
of that statute and intends to adopt them 
also. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 333 at 46 
(1974). However, that canon of statutory 
construction is not a hard and fast principle; 
it is subject to a number of exceptions, 
several of which are directly applicable in 
the instant case. In the first place, it 
is not applicable where there have material 
changes in the second statute. [Citations 
omitted.] Secondly, the above-stated rule 
of statutory construction is subject to the 
exception that if the borrowed statute is 
"given a different setting in the adopting 
state11 the construction placed upon the stat-
ute in the originating state need not be 
followed. [Citations omitted.] 
Furthermore, the canon of construction 
referred to is not applicable where the courts 
of the adopting state are clearly of the 
opinion that the foreign construction is 
erroneous. [Citations omitted.] . . . . 
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In any event this Court has indicated 
a healthy and deserved skepticism about giving 
too much credence to the various canons of 
statutory construction. In Salt Lake City 
v. Salt Lake County, Utah 568 P.2d 738 (1977) , 
the Court stated that rules of construction 
may be useful when applied in appropriate 
instances, ff[b]ut helpful as rules of con-
struction are, they are useful guides but 
poor masters; and they should not be regarded 
as having any such rigidity as to have the 
force of law, or distort an otherwise natural 
meaning or intent. Their only legitimate 
function is to assist in ascertaining the 
true intent and purpose of the statute." 
Id. at 741. 
679 P.2d at 904-05 (emphasis added). See also N. J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 52.02 (Sands 4th ed. 1984 & 
1987 Cum. Supp.).8 
With respect to the adoption of the Colorado mechanic's 
lien statute by the State of Utah, at least two of the exceptions 
to the canon of construction are applicable. First, there is a 
material distinction between the mechanic's lien statute in effect 
in the State of Colorado. Second, Guaranty Savings respectfully 
submits that the minority rule adopted by Colorado is clearly 
erroneous and that the majority rule adopted by those other states 
directly addressing this issue should be adopted. 
y
 The limited utility of the presumption on adoption of 
judicial interpretations is illustrated by the fact that Colorado 
adopted its mechanic's lien statute from California. See Chicago 
Lumber Co. v. Newcomb, 19 Colo. App. 265, 74 P. 786, 789-90 
(1903). As discussed above, California is one of the states 
whose courts have refused to establish priority from the commence-
ment of architectural work. (See pp. 21-24, supra.) 
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The decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court are based 
on a statutory scheme significantly different from that extant 
in Utah. The relevant language of the Colorado statute provides: 
All liens established by virtue of this 
article shall relate back to the time of 
the commencement of work under the contract 
between the owner and the first contractor, 
or if said contract is not in writing, then 
such liens shall relate back to and take 
effect as of the time of the commencement of 
the work upon the structure or improve-
ment . 
Colo. Rev. Stat. [1973] § 38-22-106. (The quoted language is 
identical to the Colorado statute in effect at the time of Utah's 
"adoption11 of it in 1943.) The Colorado statute also provides 
a contract recording system which places all the world on notice 
of mechanic's lien claims. Colo. Rev. Stat. [1973] 
§ 38-22-101(3). The Colorado language is obviously materially 
different from Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-5, which provides that 
liens "relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for 
the structure of improvement.11 (Emphasis added.) The words 
"on the ground" do not appear in the Colorado statute. Further-
more, the Utah statute does not incorporate a reference to work 
under a contract, let alone the filing of contracts within county 
records. 
Other than the decisions of the Colorado courts in 
Weather Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pinion Springs Condo-
miniums, Inc., 192 Colo. 495, 563 P.2d 346 (1977); and Bankers 
Trust Co. v. El Paso Pre-Cast Co.. 192 Colo. 468, 560 P.2d 457 
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(1977), there is only one jurisdiction, Oklahoma, which might 
arguably have been deemed to have adopted the same rule. The 
Oklahoma case, Midland Mortgage v. Saunders England Investments, 
682 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1984), deals only with the Oklahoma statute 
granting a lien to surveyors. There is no analysis by the Okla-
homa court of any standard analogous to that consistently applied 
by Utah courts to require that visible work be commenced on the 
ground in order to establish the priority of mechanics' liens. 
Guaranty Savings does not dispute that a contractor 
providing architectural, engineering, or surveying work is as 
entitled to a lien on the property as any other mechanic. The 
question, however, is whether such work constitutes commencement 
or work for priority purposes. Guaranty Savings respectfully 
submits that the majority rule holding that such work does not 
establish priority is the better reasoned position that effec-
tuates the proper balancing of the interests of all parties deal-
ing with real property. 
3. The "equal footing'1 doctrine compels the conclusion 
that all mechanics' liens take priority from the time 
of the first visible work of improvement on the ground. 
The mechanic's lien claimants argue that the Court 
should "recognize different points or methods of lien attachment." 
(Appellants' Brief at 11.) Such a position is clearly at odds 
with the intent and express provisions of the Utah mechanic's 
lien statute. Section 38-1-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953), clearly 
establishes that all mechanics' liens shall be on "equal footing" 
regardless of when work is performed. The clear import of Section 
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38-1-10 requires that all mechanics' liens take priority from 
the same date and, by extension, share ratably in any recovery 
against the owner. 
But Section 38-1-10 does not deal with the issue of 
priority as between mechanic's lien claimants and other secured 
parties. That issue is entirely dealt with in Section 38-1-5. 
As consistently applied by this Court, Section 38-1-5 establishes 
the requirement that work must commence on the ground. (See 
pp. 12-16, supra.) Thus, the liens of all mechanics, including 
those of architects, engineers, materialmen, and laborers, relate 
to the time that work is commenced on the ground. Clearly, archi-
tects and engineers are not entitled to a separate determination 
date nor should they be heard to argue that they are somehow 
relegated to "second class status11 as a result of a requirement 
that notice be imparted to all interested parties by the commence-
ment of work on the property before work is deemed commenced 
for priority purposes. Indeed, the fact that the priority of 
all mechanic's lien claimants is measured from commencement of 
visible work on the ground is the very mechanism by which "equal 
footing11 is accomplished. 
The mechanic's lien claimants make much of what they 
term the "anomaly of an unattached architect's lien," (Appel-
lants' Brief at 12) in the event that work is never incorporated 
into a structure. This issue is really a red herring. To estab-
lish the architect's lien as against an owner of property there 
is no requirement that it relate back to anything. The Utah 
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Supreme Court in Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, supra, 
noted that an architect is entitled to file a lien on the prop-
erty. 464 P.2d at 388. See also Western Mortgage Loan Corp. 
v. Cottonwood Construction Co. , supra, 424 P.2d at 437 (mechanic's 
lien claimants could have filed liens). 
The policy of equal footing may only be effectuated 
by applying a single objective standard for all mechanics' liens 
which binds all other parties who may deal with real property. 
That standard is the establishment of priority of all mechanics' 
liens under Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) by reference 
to the commencement of the first visible, on-site work of improve-
ment. 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT LIEN CLAIMS 
FOR WORK DONE AFTER A JUDICIAL DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
CANNOT RELATE BACK TO ANY WORK DONE PRIOR TO ANY SUCH 
DECREE. 
In an ingenious and deceptively attractive argument, 
the mechanic's lien claimants assert the position that the effect 
of a foreclosure is analogous to the effect of a lien waiver by 
contractors performing initial work constituting commencement 
of work on the ground, citing First of Denver Mortgage Investors 
v. C. N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), and Duckett v. Olsen. 
699 P.2d 734 (Utah 1985). 
This argument, however, misapprehends the distinct 
policies and considerations which come into play in the different 
contexts of foreclosures versus lien waivers. The argument at-
tempts to analogize a voluntary act of an individual mechanic's 
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lien claimant (which can affect only the rights of such indivi-
dual) to the legal effects of a foreclosure (which establishes 
by the force of law the rights of all parties with interests in 
the property other than those superior to the rights foreclosed 
upon). 
The policy behind the Utah foreclosure statute is to 
convey title free and clear of all subordinate liens and obliga-
tions on property. Utah's foreclosure statute, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) § 78-37-3 deals specifically with unrecorded liens and 
provides that: 
No person holding a conveyance from or under 
the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or 
having a lien thereon, which conveyance or 
lien does not appear of record in the proper 
office at the time of the commencement of 
that action, need be made a party to such 
action, and the judgment herein rendered, 
and the proceedings therein had, are as con-
clusive against the party holding such un-
recorded conveyance or lien as if he had 
been made a party to the action. 
This policy would be completely frustrated in the event that 
mechanic's lien claimants who perform work after the date of a 
foreclosure are entitled to priority which relates back to work 
done prior to the foreclosure. This result would render the 
foreclosure law incapable of conveying clear title through the 
extinguishment of all subordinate liens and encumbrances. 
Furthermore, the foreclosure and its attendant conse-
quences resulted in a suspension of work which interrupted the 
continuity of work undertaken with respect to the project thereby 
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cutting off the right to relate back prior to such suspension 
of work. 
Just as the foreclosure extinguished all encumbrances 
on the Fee Property, the fact that all work was suspended on 
the project for a period of approximately 12 months, (R. 1152-53), 
eliminates any valid claim by the lien claimants to any priority 
based on commencement of any work prior to that suspension. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the principles applicable to 
relation back of mechanics' liens as follows: 
For a contractor's lien to relate back to 
the commencement of work or supplying of mat-
erials by another contractor . . . both con-
tractors' projects must have been performed 
in connection with what is essentially a 
single project performed under a common plan 
prosecuted with reasonable promptness and 
without material abandonment. See, e.g. , 
Miller Electric Co. of Miami, Inc. v. Sweeny, 
Fla. App., 199 So.2d 734 (1967); National 
Lumber Co. v. Farmer & Son, Inc., 251 Minn. 
100, 87 N.W.2d 32 (1957); Fryman v. McGhee, 
108 Ohio App. 501, 163 N.E.2d 63 (1958). 
Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). See 
also Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 736 (Utah 1985). 
Although the Utah court has not indicated what con-
stitutes a "material abandonment" for this purpose, other juris-
dictions have indicated that suspension of construction for sev-
eral months requires a recommencement of work to which subsequent 
mechanics' lien relate. See, e.g., Mack Industries, Inc. v. 
Donald W. Nelson, Inc., 134 So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1961) (4-month 
interruption showed failure to "prosecute with reasonable promp-
tness") . See Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 822, 837-39 (1965 & Aug. 1987 
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Supp.). Indeed, the Utah mechanic's lien statute explicitly 
requires notices to be filed and an action to be commenced within 
one year after any 30-day suspension of work. Utah Code Ann, 
(1953) § 38-1-11. The Supreme Court of Colorado has stated that 
suspension of work for more than the 3 0-day period (which starts 
the running of the time for filing mechanics' liens) conclusively 
prevents relation back prior to a subsequent recommencement of 
work. 3190 Corp. v. Gould, 163 Colo. 356, 431 P.2d 466, 468 
(1967) (dicta). 
In addition, the decision of the Utah Supreme Court 
in Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 
18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967) clearly demonstrates that 
first work on a particular project is not necessarily the date 
to which all mechanics' liens relate. That decision implicitly 
supports the notion that any material interruption of work re-
quires a recommencement of work, even on a particular project, 
to which subsequent mechanics' liens can relate. 
POINT III. ALTERNATIVELY, APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS FAIL TO RECOG-
NIZE THAT MECHANICS' LIENS EXTEND ONLY TO SUCH REAL 
PROPERTY AS IS NECESSARY FOR THE CONVENIENT USE AND 
OCCUPATION OF THE IMPROVEMENT THAT GIVES RISE TO 
THE LIENS. 
The mechanic's lien claimants ignore the statutory-limi-
tation on the extent of mechanics' liens imposed by Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) § 38-1-4, as in effect at all times relevant to this 
action:9 
9
 See footnote 1, p. 2, supra. 
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The liens granted by this chapter shall 
extend to and cover so much of the land 
whereon such building, structure, or improve-
ment shall be made as may be necessary for 
the convenient use and occupation thereof, 
and in case any such building shall occupy 
two or more lots or other subdivisions of 
land, such lots or subdivisions shall be 
deemed one for the purposes of this chapter; 
. . . and the liens in this chapter provided 
for shall attach to all franchises, privi-
leges, appurtenances, and to all machinery 
and fixtures, pertaining to or used in connec-
tion with any such lands, buildings, struc-
tures or improvements . . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 
Court decisions from other jurisdictions with substan-
tially identical statutes demonstrate that an improvement on a 
single portion of an entire development does not entitle any 
mechanic's lienor to a lien that extends to the entire property. 
Pacific Coast Refrigeration, Inc. v. Badger, 52 Cal. App. 3d 
233, 124 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1975); Livesay v. Lee Hing, 139 Or. 
450, 9 P.2d 133 (1932) ; Tunis v. Lakeport Agricultural Park Ass'n, 
98 Cal. 285, 33 P.63 (1893). Those cases expressly reject the 
argument that the lien extends to all property that may be bene-
fited by a particular improvement. 
In this case, work performed on the Heritage office 
building does not give rise to a lien attaching to property on 
adjoining parcels covering more than 4500 additional acres. 
This additional property is not, and never has been, necessary 
for the "convenient use and occupation" of the office building. 
All on-site, visible work actually undertaken on the Heritage 
Development related only to the Leased Property or the Permit 
Property. No party has shown that any visible on-site work was 
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done on the Fee Property, other than survey staking, before or 
after the 1982 foreclosure. 
The limitation on the extent of mechanics7 liens evinces 
a dual purpose. First, a laborer and materialman should have 
the value of their work and materials as security against getting 
paid. Second, the extent of the lien is limited to the just 
expectations of the lienor and other property of the owner re-
mains unclouded, thereby not stifling further development. 
In Pacific Coast Refrigeration, Inc. v. Badger, 52 Cal. 
App. 3d 233, 124 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1975), a shopping center was 
planned as one cohesive development and several construction 
companies were engaged to build a supermarket as part of the 
center. Before completion of the center, the developer filed a 
petition for bankruptcy, and mechanics7 liens were filed on the 
entire center property including a vacant lot where, under the 
overall plan, a service station was to have been built. Reversing 
a broad scope interpretation by the trial court, the Court of 
Appeals reasoned: 
It may be argued that in view of the 
evidence the [lower] court properly considered 
the whole of the proposed shopping center as 
"the land on which [ xthe work of improvement7 ] 
is situated together with a convenient space 
about the same" under the statutory provision. 
That concept presents a certain difficulty 
where, as here, the work is not undertaken 
all at once under one general contract. When 
the development is by stages, on separate 
plots, the granting of lien on the whole to 
anyone who contributes labor or material to 
a particular unit could result in encumbering 
the entire project because of the default of 
one tenant or concessionaire. Moreover, it 
could lead to serious conflicts. 
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52. Cal. App. 3d at 245, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 793. 
The Pacific Coast Court held that mechanics' liens ori-
ginating at the site of a supermarket did not extend to a vacant 
lot intended for use as a service station, even though the super-
market and the proposed service station came under one consoli-
dated plan and were mutually financially beneficial. 52 Cal. 
App. 3d at 248, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 795. 
The Pacific Coast opinion cited with approval and adopt-
ed the analysis of Tunis v. Lakeport Agricultural Park Ass'n, 98 
Cal. 285, 33 P. 63 (1893), in which the California Supreme Court 
reversed a judgment which a mechanic's lien had been foreclosed 
on an entire 60-acre agricultural park. The 60-acre development 
consisted of a hotel, clubhouse, saloon, racetrack, stables, 
grandstand, corrals and other improvements. The particular 
improvement originating the lien was the structure housing the 
hotel, clubhouse and saloon. Explaining the rationale behind 
its decision, the Tunis Court opined, 
The expression, "the land upon which any 
building * * * is constructed, together with 
a convenient space about the same, or so 
much as may be required for the convenient 
use and occupation thereof,11 should be con-
strued to mean such space or area of land 
as is necessary to the enjoyment of the build-
ing for the purpose and view in its construc-
tion. The uses to which a building is to be 
put must manifestly, many times, determine 
the quantity of land necessary to the conve-
nient use and occupation thereof. If erected 
as a mill for sawing lumber, the space re-
quired for a log and lumber yard would be 
regarded as necessary to its use, while like 
space around a similar building for a watch 
factory might not be at all necessary. This 
thing should be borne in mind: It is for the 
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convenient use and occupation of the building 
that the land about the same is given by our 
statute; a flouring mill erected upon a large 
grain ranch would require a given space around 
it for the purposes incidental to its opera-
tions. It might require the whole ranch to 
create business for it. But it would not 
follow, under our statute, that the entire 
ranch would be subject to a lien for its 
erection. In the present case it is easy 
to see that the racetrack, with its training 
stables, grand stand, corrals, and other im-
provements, may be necessary to create busi-
ness for the hotel, club house and saloon, 
for which the building in question was con-
structed; but it is not at all apparent that 
they are necessary to the convenient use 
and occupation of the building for the pur-
poses indicated. Their uses are foreign to 
its purposes, except as they may tend to 
bring customers to its doors. 
33 P. at 63 (emphasis added). 
The same reasoning was adopted in Livesay v. Lee Hing, 
139 Or. 450, 9 P.2d 133 (1932). There, a mechanic's lien arose 
from the building of a hophouse on a 163-acre farm comprised of 
three separate tracts of land. The lower court held the lien 
extended to all 163 acres and the Oregon Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court reasoned that liens on a building do not extend to 
all surrounding land that might support the use of the building, 
but rather extends only to the land sufficient for the convenient 
use of the building for the purpose for which it was built: 
Where the land adjacent to and surrounding 
the land occupied by the building may be used 
for more than one purpose, or may be put to 
other use than that which the structure was 
intended to accommodate, [Ma convenient space 
about the same, or so much as may be required 
for the convenient use and occupation there-
of "] means such space as is reasonably neces-
sary to furnish access to and from the build-
ing, and around the building, so that it may 
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be conveniently used for the purpose for which 
it was built. 
9 P.2d at 135. 
In the instant case, the only work allegedly commenced 
was on the office structures, also known as the barn and annex, 
which are located on the Leased Property. Thus any mechanics' 
liens that may arise or attach by virtue of work on such improve-
ments, i.e., the barn and annex, extend only to so much land as 
may be necessary for their convenient use and occupation as office 
buildings. The fact that the office buildings were intended to 
be used as the administrative and sales offices for a substan-
tial ski resort development does not entitle mechanics' lienors 
who rendered work on the office building structures (or whose 
liens attach only by virtue of work upon such structures, such 
as the architects) to claim a lien on the entire property intended 
to be developed. 
The proposed ski resort development encompassed several 
distinct parcels which were separately described and as to which 
the type of estate held by the developer, Heritage Mountain, 
differed from piece to piece. The office buildings or barn and 
annex were located on only one parcel, the Leased Property. 
The Fee Property and the Permit Property were not necessary for 
the convenient use and occupation of the barn and annex. Indeed, 
the offices and their functions could have been carried out at 
any off-site location. The location of the office building on 
the ski resort site was merely a matter of convenience to the 
entire development. The development was not convenient and 
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necessary to the use of the office structures. Thus, any work 
performed on the office building could establish priority for 
liens only with respect to the Leased Property.10 
It would be unrealistic and bad policy to construe the 
mechanic's lien law to encumber, and potentially cripple, a wide-
ranging project contemplating millions of dollars, hundreds of 
acres, and years of time by virtue of the fact that a single, 
small improvement was begun on one corner of one parcel of prop-
erty which is included within the development. Such would be 
the result if the work on such corner establishes the priority 
for all work done on the project where construction loans have 
been advanced only for a particular phase of the project. 
Financing for large-scale projects would simply be unavailable 
since no lender would advance or even commit to advance the entire 
amount necessary for a development of such scope. 
Hotels, golf courses, restaurants, trains, skiing facil-
ities, etc., developed as part of an overall scheme may well 
contribute to the financial success of the whole as business is 
generated and referred between them. As illustrated in the case 
law of other western jurisdictions cited above, however, the 
mechanic's lien statute does not grant a lien to all providers 
1 U
 The record demonstrates that work on the office building 
had been suspended by the summer of 1982 prior to the foreclosure. 
(R. 1148-49, 1156, 1245-46.) Remodeling was later undertaken 
after the recording of Guaranty Savings' Trust Deed. (R. 1152-53, 
1238.) As such, Guaranty Savings is entitled to priority even 
as to the Heritage interest in Leased Property. 
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of services and materials on the entire development as soon as 
work is commenced on the first structure. 
Those jurisdictions which have construed language sub-
stantially identical to Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-4 have 
clearly indicated that the focus of the inquiry is upon how much 
land is necessary for the convenient use and occupation of a 
particular improvement and not on the amount of land that may 
be benefited by the construction of the improvement. The extent 
of any particular mechanic's lien depends upon the character of 
the improvement itself. 
Section 38-1-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953), clearly contem-
plates that lot boundaries or other boundaries created by subdivi-
sions of land shall mark the outside limit of land to which the 
mechanics7 liens may extend. In the instant case, any lien that 
may have been established by virtue of work upon the barn and 
annex cannot extend beyond the boundaries of the Leased Property. 
As to the Fee Property, there was simply no improvement, before 
or after the Paramount Foreclosure, to which any mechanics' lien 
claimants could relate back. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth above, and the stat-
utes and cases cited therein, this Court should affirm the dis-
trict court's Order of Partial Summary Judgment as to the issue 
of priority. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
KETCHUM, KONKEL, BARRETT, NICKEL ) 
& AUSTIN, dba KKBNA INCORPORATED 
a Utah corp., ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
KENT W. WALKER and MICHAEL V. 
LEE, a Utah partnership, dba THE 
ARCHITECTURAL PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants. 
SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION 
a California corporation, et al 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case Number 69,472 
RULINC 
******** 
The plaintiffs initiated this action against Heritage 
Mountain and defendant Guaranty Savings & Loan Association who 
received a $16.9 million dollar loan from Guaranty which was 
secured by deeds of trust recorded June 29, 1983 and September 
15, 1983. The lienholders consist of architects and engineers, 
which include three plaintiffs, Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel 
and Austin, dba KKBNA Incorporated; Walker and Lee, dba The 
Architectural Partnership; and Shelden Pollack Corporation. The 
defendants Langenheim Associates, Delta Geotechnical Consultants 
and Forsgren-Perkins Engineering, P.A. all performed consulting, 
engineering or architectural services., The other class of lien 
claimants are entities associated with Heritage Mountain 
Development, Inc., lending institutions (not claiming priority 
over Guaranty) or contractors who performed labor or supplied 
materials subsequent to recording Guaranty's trust deed in 
September of 1983. 
The property which has been liened consist of three 
distinct parcels, (1) 40 acres of property leased from the State 
of Utah where a barn has been remodeled into an office building; 
(2) 110 acre of undeveloped fee property; and (3) 4500 acres of 
undeveloped U.S. Forest Service permits. 
The above mechanic lien claimants are claiming priority 
over the trust deeds of Guaranty Savings & Loan Association. 
It is to be noted that prior to this action there have 
been two other phases to this litigation involving Heritage 
Mountain's and various lien claims. They are as follows: 
1. First Security Bank of Utah v. Wilderness 
Associates, Civil No. 54367. This proceeding culminated in a 
sheriff's sale on December 23, 1982, based upon a judgment 
entered by the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court wherein it was decreed that: 
"...each person whose conveyance or encumberance 
is unrecorded or was recorded subsequent to the 
plaintiffs' filing of the lis pendens be, and 
hereby is, declared to be forever barred or 
foreclosed of all right, claim, lien and equity or 
other right of redemption in and to the total 
property or any portion thereof." 
The sheriff's sale held on December 23, 1982 resulted in 
Paramount Life Insurance Company as the successful bidder and 
there was no redemption and a sheriff's deed was later issued to 
Paramount Life Insurance Company. 
2. The second phase was a suit filed by Dwayne J. Sykes 
v Wilderness Associates, Civil No. 62546, wherein Sykes attempted 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien recorded with the county recorder 
after the commencement of the First Security foreclosure action. 
Sykes had not been named as a party in the first phase of the 
litigation, but this court ruled that Sykes claims were 
extinguished pursuant to the judgment and decree of foreclosure 
in the first phase. 
3. The present proceeding is the third phase pursuant 
to which the motions for summary judgment are now before the 
court and the litigation involves Wilderness Associates and its 
successor, Heritage Mountain Development Company, wherein the 
architects, engineers and surveyors, contractors and other 
lending institutions all seek priority over Guaranty Savings & 
Loan Association's trust deed. 
The Court has considered all the memorandum filed by 
parties to this lawsuit having an interest in the matter of 
priorities, and has heard oral argument from all parties desiring 
to present the same to the court, and after reviewing this matter 
further the court has concluded as enters the following: 
RULING 
The motion of defendant Guaranty Savings & Loan 
Association for partial summary judgment establishing the order 
of priorities in this lawsuit is granted. 
The court has concluded that, although a question of 
first impression in the State of Utah, the majority of 
jurisdictions in the United States, through what the court 
concludes to be the best reasoned decisions hold that 
"commencement of work", for the purpose of establishing priority 
of recorded encumbrances require visible on-site commencement of 
work to establish the priority of mechanic's liens- Archtectural 
and engineering work not on the site where improvements are to be 
built, and survey staking for the purpose of establishing 
boundaries, do not fall within the visible, on-site commencement 
of work concept which the majority of the states adhere to. This 
interpretation is consistant with the language of Section 38-1-5 
U.C.A. which provides that: 
H
. . . liens . . . take effect as of the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish materials 
on the ground . . . and shall have priority over 
other encumbrances which . . . attached 
subsequently to the time when . . . the structure 
was commenced, work begun or first material 
furnished on the ground, . . ." 
The reasons generally announced for the on-site 
requirement involve the commercial necessity of the financier of 
the project, before money would be advanced for such 
improvements, to be accorded priority upon recording his 
financing documents if there is no on-site indication that other 
mechanic's have expended labor or furnished material prior to 
such recording. 
Without this protection, lending institutions would be 
reluctant to lend money for the development of projects such as 
the one in question. 
It appears that certain mechanic's liens filed by those 
improving the barn on the 40 acre leased tract were performed 
after the filing of the last of Guaranty's trust deeds, and would 
therefore not predate the filings of Guaranty nor preempt its 
first position. 
The claims of the architects although there work was 
done after the second phase of litigation but prior to the filing 
of Guaranty's trust deeds do not preempt Guaranty since their 
work as well as the engineers, surveyors and other consultants 
did not constitute "visible on-site improvements". 
All other claims for work done prior to the recordation 
of Guaranty's trust deeds are barred by virtue of the decision in 
the first phase of the litigation in this matter (Civil no. 
54367) and the subsequent ruling in phase 2 (Civil no. 62546). 
The court notes that the architects and engineers do 
have valid lien rights for the work they have done subject to the 
priority determination as hereinabove made, and that those liens 
apparently affect the overall project and to the extent that they 
come subsequent to the phase 1 ruling would be valid liens 
applying to all of the property of the project. 
The crosss motions for summary judgment by Nordic, 
Walker and Lee and all other parties hereto seeking to establish 
their priority over the trust deeds of Guaranty are denied. 
Counsel for the defendant Guaranty Savings & Loan 
Association is directed to prepare and appropriate order of 
partial summary judgment based upon the above and foregoing 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this Q, * ' day of September, 
1986. 
/L&D-
BALLIF, JUDGE 
LeROY S. AXLAND, Esq. 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. 
CARL F. HUEFNER, Esq. 
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Guaranty Savings & Loan Association 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KETCHUK, KONKEL, BARRETT, 
NICKEL and AUSTIN, d/b/a 
KKBNA INCORPORATED, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
and GUARANTY SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Arkansas 
savings and loan association, 
Defendants. 
KENT W. WALKER and MICHAEL V. 
LEE, d/b/a THE ARCHITECTURAL 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, et al., 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
GUARANTY SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND JUDGEMENT 
REGARDING PRIORITY 
INTERESTS AMONG PARTIES 
Consolidated 
Civil No. 69472 
Judge George E. Ballif 
Defendants. 
SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION ) 
a California corporation, et al.) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT ) 
COMPANY, et al. ) 
Defendants. ) 
On June 4, 1986, defendant, Guaranty Savings and Loan 
Association, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
issue of the priority of claims on the relevant real property 
which, is the subject matter of this litigation. On June 30, 
1986, defendant Nordic Constructors, Inc. filed a cross motion 
for Summary Judgment on the same issue as did plaintiff Sheldon 
L. Pollock Corporation and Norbert W. Pieper, AIA, Inc. on August 
27, 1986. Various memoranda were filed by the parties in support 
of and in opposition to the various motions filed herein and 
the court heard oral argument from all parties desiring to present 
the same to the court on Tuesday, September 9, 1986 at 2:30 p.m. 
After consideration of the memoranda, argument of counsel, affi-
davits and untraversed deposition testimony, and being fully 
advised in the premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-
ation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and the same 
hereby is granted. 
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2. That defendant Nordic Constructors, Inc.'s Motion 
for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is denied. 
3. That plaintiff Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation 
and Norbert W. Pieper, AIA, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
be, and the same hereby is denied. 
4. That defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-
ation's Deed of Trust dated June 17, 1983 and recorded in the 
office of the County Recorder of Utah County, Utah on September 
15, 1983, as Entry No. 28168 in Book 2078, pages 40-59 securing 
payment in the amount of $16.9 million dollars (herein "Deed of 
Trust") is a valid subsisting first lien upon the property des-
cribed therein (hereinafter "Property"), said Property being 
situate in Utah County, Utah, more particularly described as: 
Parcel #1 
Beginning at a Point which is South 2233.73 feet and East 
1353.38 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
193.37 feet; thence West 121.53 feet; thence N 22#23/00,/ W 123.00 
feet; thence N 20,36'47" E 501.28 feet; thence S 89#59'28" E 
20.00 feet; thence S 52*28'32" E 673.06 feet; thence S 11#27'09" 
E 82.42 feet; thence East 209.11 feet; thence South 686.56 feet; 
thence S 89e26'Q9" W 69.89 feet; thence N 11°27'09" W 305.86 feet; 
thence N 81°10'45" W 664.63 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel *2 
Beginning at a point which is South 1457.44 feet and East 
1381.49 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S 
82#28/18/r E 297.19 feet; thence S 35#46'49" E 390.19 feet; thence 
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ll#27'09'r E 55.58 feet; thence N 52#28'32" W 673.06 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Parcel #3 
Beginning at a point which is South 1812.93 feet and East 
1904.26 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N 
35#46'49" W 390.19 feet; thence S 82*28'18" E 230.12 feet; thence 
South 286.40 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel |4 
Beginning at a point which is South 1457.44 feet and East 
948.28 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N 
35°00/00,/ E 248.48 feet; thence S 55°00'00" E 354.87 feet; thence 
N 89*59'28" W 20.00 feet; thence West 413.21 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Parcel #5 
Beginning at a point which is South 1095.69 feet and East 
1309.00 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S 
49#07'07" E 450.31 feet; thence S 65#30'00" E 280.00 feet; thence 
N 41#01/45" E 360.30 feet; thence South 713.45 feet; thence West 
209.11 feet; thence N ll#27'09/f W 138.00 feet; thence North 286.40 
feet; thence N 82°28'18" W 527.31 feet; thence N 55°00'00" W 
314.87 feet; thence along the arc of a 700.00 foot radius curve 
to the right 260.74 feet, the chord of which bears N 45#40'15" 
E 259.24 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel ie 
Beginning at a point which is South 1095.69 feet and East 
1309.00 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence along 
the arc of a 500.00 foot radius curve to the left 219.09 feet, 
the chord of which nears N 43p47'21" E 217.34 feet; thence S 
58#45'49" E 133.73 feet; thence N 35*00'00" E 220.00 feet; thence 
East 564.44 feet; thence S 3*19'16" W 407.49 feet; thence West 
100.00 feet; thence S 41#01'45" W 360.30 feet; thence N 65#30'00" 
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W 280.00 feet; thence N 49#07'07" W 450.31 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Parcel #7 
Beginning at a point which is South 2 664.4 6 feet and East 
35.24 feet from the North Quarter corner of Section 5, Township 
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S 
89°26'09" W 530.26 feet; thence North 320.74 feet; thence S 
66#59'43" E 575,11 feet; thence S 00°45'28" E 90.00 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
parcel #8 
Beginning at a point which is South 1234.73 feet and East 
2240.76 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N 
73°04'51" E 428.70 feet; thence S 00°45'28" E 1429.67 feet; thence 
N 66°54'43" W 575.11 feet; thence North 562.81 feet; thence East 
425.00 feet; thence North 125.00 feet; thence West 425.00 feet; 
thence North 197.50 feet; thence East 425.00 feet; thence North 
125.00 feet; thence West 425.00 feet; thence North 68.95 feet; 
thence East 100.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel #9 
Beginning at a point which is South 1234.73 feet and East 
2240.76 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N 
3#19'16" E 407.49 feet; thence East 75.56 feet; thence N 58°17'49" 
E 358.21 feet; thence S 00M5'28" E 470.33 feet; thence S 
73•04'51" W 428.70 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel "D" 
Commencing at a point located South 2233.72 feet and East 
1353.37 feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 5, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
81°10'45" East 664.64 feet; thence South 11°27'09" East 300.00 
feet; thence South 89°10'45" West along a fence line 596.98 feet; 
thence South 87°52'55" West along a fence line 93.49 feet; thence 
North 58*17' West along a fence line 15.65 feet; thence South 
88*45'30" West along a fence line 12.69 feet; thence north 400.00 
feet to the point of beginning. 
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Parcel "F" 
Commencing at a point located South 1457.4 3 feet and East 
955.78 feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 5, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East 
405.70 feet; thence South 20#36'47" West 197.28 feet; thence 
South 78•34'15" West 300.90 feet; thence North 09#36' West along 
the Easterly bank of the Upper East Union Canal 247.74 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
Paraiflgyirt Life Parcel 
Beginning at a point which is North 114.11 feet and East 
388.71 feet from the East Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township 
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence along 
the arc of an 893.64 foot radius curve to the right 449.70 feet, 
the chord of which bears North 20*35'02" East 444.97 feet; thence 
North 35°00'00" East 556.99 feet; thence South 43°30'00" East 
436.93 feet; thence South 670.00 feet; thence East 154.39 feet; 
thence North 24.92 feet, thence North 88°45'30" East 12.69 feet; 
thence South 58°17'00" East 15.65 feet; thence North 89* 16'50" 
East 672.01 feet; thence South 10•02'24" East 402.68 feet; thence 
South 21*26'15" East 442.45 feet; thence South 10*29'00" West 
603.46 feet; thence North 89°17'00" West 575.53 feet; thence North 
4'26'00" West 130.08 feet; thence North 6* 12'30" West 242.43 feet; 
thence North 8*43'30* East 232.11 feet; thence North 3 3•34'00" 
East 50.89 feet; thence North 89#30'30" West 505.62 feet; thence 
South 0#08'00" East 43.42 feet; thence North 89°31'36" West 546.46 
feet; thence North 42°55/46// West 75.43 feet; thence along the 
arc of a 15 foot radius curve to the right 23.56 feet, the chord 
of which bears North 2•04'20* East 21.21 feet; thence North 
47t04'14" East 10.00 feet; thence North 42#55'46" West 80.00 
feet; thence along the arc of a 15 foot radius curve to the right 
23.56 feet, the chord of which bears North 87°55'4 0" West 21.21 
feet; thence North 42°55'46" West 32.00 feet; thence along the 
arc of a 222.73 foot radius curve to the right 190.86 feet, the 
chord of which bears North 18°22'52" West 185.07 feet; thence 
North 6°10'03" East 518.03 feet to the point of beginning. 
- 6 -
LEASED LANDS 
U.S. Forest Service: 
The Heritige Mountain resort area within Sections 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, T. 6 S., R. 3 E. and Sections 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, T. 7 S., R. 3 E., Salt Lake Base and Meridian as delin-
eated on the permit area map. 
The Heritage Mountain resort area with Sections 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, T. 6 S., R. 3 E. and Sections 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, To 7 S., R. 3 E., which is attached and made a part of 
the permit. 
City of Provo, Utah: 
TRACT 1: 
Beginning at a point on a fence line on the South line of 
300 North Street in Provo, Utah, East 80.62 feet and South 738.84 
feet from the West quarter corner of Section 5, Township 7 South, 
Range 3 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running 
thence South 89 '31' 36" East along a fence line on said South 
line of 300 North Street, 998.04 feet; thence North 0°08' West 
along a fence line projected 43.42 feet to the North line of 
300 North Street projected; thence South 89*30'3 0" East along 
the North line of 300 North Street projected 505.62 feet to the 
West bank of the Upper East Union Canal; thence southerly along 
the westerly bank of said canal on the following courses and 
distances: South 33*34' West 50.89 feet; thence South 8#43'30" 
West 232.11 feet; thence South 6#12'30" East 242,33 feet; thence 
South 4a26' East 130.08 feet to the North line of 150 North Street 
projected; thence leaving the said bank of said canal and running 
North 89*17' West along the line of the Street projected 144.05 
feet; thence North 1*27'30* East 97.88 feet; thence North 
89#15'39" West 231.01 feet; thence South 81#51'06" West 372.80 
feet; thence South 0*49'12" West 40.51 feet; thence North 89°17' 
West 739.91 feet; thence South 0o32'20" West 61.87 feet; thence 
North 89°22'20" West 621.21 feet; thence North 0°20'20" East along 
a fence line 654.96 feet; thence South 89°22'20" East along a 
fence line of the South line of 300 North Street a distance of 
623.50 feet, to the point of beginning. 
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TRACT NO. 2: 
Beginning at a point which is South 1872.32 feet and East 
69.75 feet from the East quarter corner of Section 6, Township 
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running 
thence North 88•15'46* West 922.76 feet; thence along the arc 
of a 297.89 foot radius curve to the right 295.20 feet, the chord 
of which bears North 21*IT21" East 283.27 feet; thence North 
59#51' East 425.03 feet; thence South 89°22/20" East 411.47 feet; 
thence South 0#32'20/r West 478.59 feet to the point of beginning. 
5. Defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Association's 
right, title, claim, lien and interest in and to the Property 
is hereby adjudged to be prior and superior both in time and as 
of right of the title, claims, liens and interests of all named 
parties, and each and all of them, and of all other persons or 
entities claiming any right to the title, claim, lien or interest 
in and to the Property and the whole thereof. 
6. That the rights, title, claims, liens and interest 
of all named parties in and to the Property are hereby adjudged 
to be subsequent, junior, subordinate and inferior to the lien 
and claim of defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Association in 
and to the Property. 
7. That the architectural and engineering work per-
formed with respect to the Property does not constitute "com-
mencement of work" for purposes of establishing priority as pro-
vided in Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-5. 
8. That the architectural and engineering work per-
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formed with respect to the Property constitutes a lien on the 
property as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 38*1-3. 
9. This Court expressly finds that there is no just 
reason for delaying the entry of a Final Judgment on the issue 
of the priority of interests among the various parties in this 
action in and to the Property. Accordingly, this Court hereby 
expressly directs the entry of this Final Judgment against all 
parties on the issue of Guaranty Savings and Loan Association's 
prior interest in and to the Property and an appeal herefrom 
may be taken pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
10. The defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-
ation is awarded its costs of court herein expended. 
DATED this / £ day of November, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: £
foRGE l&fB GEOR 32/ ALLIF 
District Court Judge 
^ T M U N O H M N E O CLER* O* THI oBTwcr ceo. 
OP OTAH cousr,. UTAH, oc H££e; ctRT.r, MA. r. 
\NNr * -D AHO FOH6GOIN© IS A TRUe A N L < - ^ ; - ^ _ • 
SU ORSS.NAL DOCUMENT ON MIS IN MY D?r V AS S>: 
^WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL OP SAIO COU«T »w.. 
^OAY Of JLJ^L^JM^. 
VIUIAM ytfOlSH,,CtOT / ' 
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U t a h Code A n n . ( 1 9 5 3 ) 
38-1-4. Amount of land affected—Lots and subdivisions—Mines—Fran-
chises, fixtures and appurtenances.—The liens granted by this chapter shall 
extend to and cover so much of the land whereon such building, structure 
or improvement shall be made as may be necessary for the convenient 
use and occupation thereof, and in case any such building shall oecupy 
two or more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots or subdivisions 
shall be deemed one for the purposes of this chapter; and when two or 
more mining claims, mines or valuable deposits, whether owned by the 
same person or not, shall, with the consent of all, be worked through a 
common shaft, tunnel, incline, drift or other excavation, then all the mining 
claims, mines or valuable deposits so worked shall for the purposes of this 
chapter be deemed one; and the liens in this chapter provided for shall 
attach to all franchises, privileges, appurtenances, and to all machinery and 
fixtures, pertaining to or used in connection with any such lands, buildings, 
structures or improvements, mining claims, mines or valuable deposits 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, 
§§1377, 1379, 1381; C. L. 1917, §§3727, 
3729, 3731; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-4. 
38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances.—The liens herein provided 
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the commence-
ment to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or im-
provement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other en-
cumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first 
material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was un-
recorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was com-
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, 
§§ 1384, 1385; C. L. 1917, §§ 3734, 3735; 
R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-5. 
38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing regardless 
of time of filing.—The liens for work and labor done or material furnished 
as provided in this chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of 
date of filing the notice and claim of lien and regardless of the time of 
performing such work and labor or furnishing such material. 
History: Code Report; R. S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 52-1-10. 
1 £ 
U t a h Code Ann. (1953) 
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for—Lis pendens—Action for debt not 
affected.—Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must be begun 
within twelve months after the completion of the original contract, or 
the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within 
the twelve months herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record 
with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded 
a notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions 
affecting the title or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall 
be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the action 
and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, 
and the burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming 
under him to show such actual knowledge. Nothing herein contained shall 
be construed to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a per-
sonal action to recover the same. 
History: R. 3. 1898 & 0. L. 1907, 
§§ 1390, 1395; C. L. 1917, §§ 3740, 3745; L. 
1931, ch. 5, §1; B. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-1-11. 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
78-37-3. Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights barred. 
No person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor of the prop-
erty mortgaged, or having a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien does not 
appear of record in the proper office at the time of the commencement of the 
action, need be made a party to such action, and the judgment therein ren-
dered, and the proceedings therein had, are as conclusive against the party 
holding such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had been made a party to 
the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Necessary joinder of parties, Rule 19, 
Supp., 104-37-3. U.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — County recorder, Parties defendant generally, Rule 17, 
Chapter 21 of Title 17. U.R.C.P. 
Utah Code Ann, f!953, as amended 1987) 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or fur-
nishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alter-
ation, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans 
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, esti-
mates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like 
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property 
upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service ren-
dered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1372, 
1381, 1382, 1397; L. 1911, ch. 27, § 12; C.L. 
1917, §§ 286, 3722, 3731, 3732, 3747; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-3; L. 1973, ch. 73, § 1; 
1981, ch. 170, § 1; 1987, ch. 170, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1981 amendment 
inserted references to renting and equipment 
throughout the section. 
The 1987 amendment deleted "all persons 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, g§ 1377, 
1379, 1381; C.L. 1917, §§ 3727, 3729, 3731; 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-4; L. 1987, ch. 170, 
S 2. 
I, who shall do work or furnish materials for the 
prospecting, development, preservation or 
»• working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil 
J or gas well, or deposit" following "manner" in 
the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence 
fc
 so as to delete a provision relating to the inter-
•* est of a lessee of a mining claim, and made 
minor changes in phraseology. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1987 amendment 
rewrote the section to the extent that a de-
tailed analysis is impracticable. 
38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions 
— Franchises, fixtures, and appurtenances. 
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and cover so much of the 
land whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall be made as may 
be necessary for convenient use and occupation of the land. In case any such 
building shall occupy two or more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots 
or subdivisions shall be considered as one for the purposes of this chapter. The 
liens provided for in this chapter shall attach to all franchises, privileges, 
appurtenances, and to all machinery and fixtures, pertaining to or used in 
connection with any such lands, buildings, structures, or improvements. 
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ARTICLE 22 
General Mechanics' Lien 
Crms reference: For liens on moior vehicles, see § 4-9-302 and article <S at tale 42. 
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3M-22-101. Liens in favor of whom • when filed. (1) Every person who sup-
plies machinery, toois. or equipment in the prosecution of 'he work, and 
mechanics, materialmen, contractors, subcontractors, builders, and ail per-
sons of every class performing labor upon or furnishing directlv to (he ov.ner 
or persons furnishing labor materials to be used in construction, ..iteration, 
improvement, addition to. or repair, either in whole or in part, of .an build-
ing, mail, bridr.e. ditch, flume, aqueduct, reservoir, tunnel, fence, lailroau. 
waeon road, tramway, or any other structure or improvement upon l.ind. 
mciuding adjacent curb, euttcr. and sidewalk, and also architects, cnginects. 
uraftsmen. and artisans who have furnished designs, plans, -Lis . rn:.p^ 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys, or superintendence, o\ 
who have rendered other professional or skilled service, or he-towed laoot 
in whole or in part, describing or illustrating, or superintend'-1:: suet, struc-
ture, or work done or to be done, or any part connected therewith, sluil 
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have a lien upon the property upon which they have supplied machinery, 
tools, or equipment or rendered service or bestowed labor or for which they 
have furnished materials or mining or milling machinery or other fixtures, 
for the value of such machinery, tools- or equipment supplied, or services 
rendered or labor done or material furnished, whether at the instance of the 
owner, or of any other person acting by his authority or under him, as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise for the machinery, tools, or equipment supplied, or 
work or labor done or services rendered or materials furnished by each, 
respectively, whether supplied or done or furnished or rendered at the 
instance of the owner of the building or other improvement, or his agent; 
and every contractor, architect, engineer, subcontractor, buiider, agent, or 
other person having charge of the construction, alteration, addition to, or 
repair, either in whole or in part, of said building or other improvement shall 
be held to be the agent of the owner for the purposes of this article. 
(2) In case of a contract for the work, between the reputed owner and 
a contractor, the lien shail extend to the entire contract price, and such con-
tract shall operate as a lien in favor of all persons performing labor or ser-
vices or furnishing materials under contract, express or implied, with said 
contractor, to the extent of the whole contract price; and after all such liens 
are satisfied, then as a lien for any balance of such contract price in favor 
of the contractor. 
(3) All such contracts shall be in writing when the amount :o be paid 
thereunder exceeds five hundred dollars, and shall be subscribed by the par-
ties thereto. The contract, or a memorandum thereof, setting forth the names 
of all the partes to the contract a description :>f the property to b^ affected 
thereby, together with a statement of the general character oi the work to 
be done, the estimated total amount to be paid thereunder, together with the 
times or stages of the work for making payments, shall be filed by the owner 
or reputed owner, in the office of the conntv cierk and recorder of the county 
where the property, or the principal portion thereof, is situated before the 
work is commenced under and in accordance with the terms of the contract. 
In case such contract, or a memorandum thereof, is not so filed, the labor 
done and materials furnished by ail persons shall be deemed to have been 
done and furnished at the personal instance of the owner, and such persons 
shall have a lien for the value thereof. 
(4) For tne purposes of this article, the value of labor done shall include, 
but not be limited to, the payments required under any labor contract to any 
trust established for the provision of any pension, profit-sharing, vacation, 
health and welfare, prepaid legal services, or apprentice training benefits ioc 
the use of the employees o( any contractors, and the trustee of any such 
trust shall have a lien therefor. 
<5) AH claimants who establish the right to a lien or claim under any of 
the provisions of this article *hail be entitled to receive interest on any \ueh 
lien or claim at the rale provided for under the terms of any ..ontrac: or 
agreement under which the labor or material was supplied or. in the absence 
of an agreed rate, at the rate of twelve percent per annum. 
Source: L. I.W. p. 2M, § !; R. S. 08, § 4025:-C. L. § M42; CSA, C. 101. 
§ 15; CRS 53, § S6-3-I; C.R.S. !%3. § 86-3-1; L. 65, n. x-w. § I; L. w. i«. 
6')2, § l;L. 75.p. 142:, § 1. 
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38-22-106. Priority of lien - attachments. (I) All liens established by virtue 
of this article shall relate back to the time of the commencement of work 
under the contract between the owner and the first contractor,Cor. if s..ui 
contract is not in writing, then such liens shall relate back to and take effect 
as of the time of the commencement of the work upon the structure or 
impri vement. and .%hall have priori:} over any lien or eneurahiance vii'se-
quent!}' intervening, or which may have been created prior thereto but which 
was not then recorded and of which the lienor, under this article, did not 
have actual notice. Nothing contained in this section, however, shall be con-
strued as impairing any valid encumbrance upon any such land duly made 
and recorded prior to the signing of such contract or the commencement ol 
work upon such improvements or structure. 
(2) No attachment, garnishment, or levy under an execution upon any 
money due or to become due to a contractor from the owner or reputed 
owner of any such property subject to any such lien shall be valid as against 
such lien of a subcontractor or materialmen, and no such attachment, garnish-
ment. or levy upon any money due to a subcontractor or materialmen o( 
the second clavs. as provided in section 3N-22-10K (1) (hh from the contractor 
shall be valid as against any lien ol a laborer employed Dy the uay or piece. 
who does not furnish any material as classified in this article. 
Source: L. ISW. p. 2M. § h: R. S. us. § 4030; C. L. § M47;CSA. C. in I. 
§ 20; CKS 53. § sfc-.W C.R.S. !%3. § M-3-* 
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May 27, 1983 
TO: ALL FNMA LENDERS 
SUBJECT: Utah Senate Bill 300 
This legislation, effective May 14, 1983, provides in ef-
fect that assessment liens of condominium associations will 
no longer be subordinate to mortgages or deeds of trust* 
FNMA requires that liens of first mortgages or deeds of 
trust have priority over such assessment liens. 
We are advised that as a result of S.B. 300 funding for 
condominium unit mortgages may no longer be available in 
Utah. We also understand that the problems created by 
S.B. 300 may be resolved by a special session of the legis-
lature to be held on June 23, 1983* 
In order to make funding available during this interim 
period, FNMA will purchase otherwise eligible condorainium 
first trust deeds, made prior to June 23, 1983, or partici-
pation interests therein* Lenders must verify with any 
applicable mortgage insurer or guarantor (MI/FHA/VA) that 
any mortgage insurance or guarantee is not impaired by 
reason of S.B. 300. Such loans need not have specific title 
insurance to insure priority over such assessment liens, if 
such insurance is not available. Purchases without such 
title insurance will be made on the basis that the lender 
will, by selling such loans, or participation interests, 
agree to indemnify and hold harmless FNMA from (1) any re-
quirement to pay condominium assessment liens which have or 
may attain priority and (2) any loss caused by foreclosure 
of such prior assessment liens. 
With respect to pending applications for approval of con-
ventional condominium projects in Utah, we will be unable 
to issue final project approvals for such projects at this 
time. 
FNMA 
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